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April 1965]

Recent Developments -

Withholding Taxes on Wage Dividends for PreBankruptcy Wages Assigned to Fourth
Priority in Distribution of Bankrupt's
Estate-In re Connecticut Motor
Lines, Inc.*
Among claims against a bankrupt estate were those for unpaid
wages and vacation pay earned within three months of the bankruptcy of the employer. The referee ordered distribution of the
amount of the claims, assigning them second priority, but he refused to authorize deduction of income withholding tax and social
security taxes from these payments as requested by the Government.

• !1!16 F.2d 96 (!Id Cir, 1964).
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The district court reversed, holding the trustee in bankruptcy
liable for the taxes as a first priority administrative expense. 1 On
appeal, held, reversed. Taxes based on wage claims accruing prior
to bankruptcy but paid during bankruptcy are section 64a(4) "taxes
legally due and owing by the bankrupt."
In the principal case, the Third Circuit faced for the first time
the troublesome situation in which wages earned prior to the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy are paid by the trustee in the form
of dividends to wage claimants. The assessment of income withholding tax2 and social security tax3 payments on these distributions
has been a topic of extended controversy in the past, especially in
relation to the priorities system of the Bankruptcy Act. Although
the spirit of the act is equality of distribution among creditors,~
section 64a provides for unsecured claims of certain creditors to be
placed in one of five classes, each class taking precedence over those
following. 5 Costs and expenses of administration of the bankrupt
estate are accorded first priority, wage claims second priority, and
taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt fourth priority.6
Payment of unsecured claims not within one of the five classes is
postponed until those having priority have been paid in full.
It is clear that the bankrupt estate in the hands of the trustee in
bankruptcy is not immune from taxation. 7 However, the priority
section of the act does not in terms draw a distinction between
pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy taxes-that is, between taxes
incurred by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy and taxes incurred
during the course of administration of the bankrupt estate.8 The
I. In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
2. INT, R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3401-02.
3. INT, R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3101-02, 3111.
4. See United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 31 (1959); Wurzel,
Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1141 (1942).
5. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 30 Stat. 563, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (Supp. V, 1964). Claims
secured by valid liens must be satisfied in full under the provisions of § 67(d) before
§ 64(a) becomes operative. See In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.
1956); Dunn v. Interstate Bond Co., 68 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1934).
6. Section 64(a) reads in part as follows: "The debts to have priority in advance of
the payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates,
and the order of payment shall be • • •
"(l) the costs and expenses of administration including the actual and necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition ••• ;
"(2) wages and commissions, not to exceed 600 to each claimant, which have been
earned within three months before ,the date of the commencement of ,the proceeding . . . ;
"(4) taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or any
State or subdivision thereof • • • ."
Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 30 Stat. 563, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
7. Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441 (1904). See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 62,14, at
1518 (14th ed. 1964).
8. See In re William F. Fisher &: Co., 148 Fed. 907 (D.N.J. 1906). The Supreme
Court has refrained from distinguishing between current and pre-bankruptcy tax
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courts have nevertheless considered the date on which the petition
in bankruptcy is filed as critical in determining the right to priority
under section 64a.9 Taxes which have accrued and can be computed
as provable claims10 at the time the petition is filed are within the
fourth priority. 11 Taxes accruing subsequent to the filing date which
arise out of carrying on the bankrupt's business are expenses of
administration entitled to the first priority.12
The landmark case of United States v. Fogarty 13 held that the
trustee stands in the shoes of the bankrupt employer when distributing dividends for pre-bankruptcy wages, and that the dividends are
to be treated as actual wages, the trustee being required to withold
the appropriate taxes due the United States. Since the taxes in
Fogarty were not due and payable at the time the petition was
filed but only when the "wages" were paid by the trustee,14 the
court classsified them as a first priority expense of administration. 15
Although ably and vigorously attacked by legal theoreticians on
several occasions16 and consistently ignored or rejected in decisions
by the referees in bankruptcy, the Fogarty precept has endured in
claims. Arkansas Corp. Comm'r v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 132 (1941); Dayton v. Stanard,
241 U.S. 588 (1916), See Wurzel, supra note 4, at 1142.
9. See New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483 (1906); In re Lambertville Rubber
op. cit. supra note 7, § 64.01, at 2058.
IO. It is the date of assessment or of an establishment of the liability for the tax,
rather than the date of payment, that controls. New Jersey v. Anderson, supra
note 9; In re International Match Corp., 79 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1935); In re Wells,
4 F. Supp. 329 (D. Md. 1933).
11. In re International Match Corp., supra note 10; In re Flynn, 134 Fed., 145 (D.
Mass. 1905); In re Fago Constr. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 238 (W.D.N.Y. 1957).
12. Boteler v. Ingels, 308 U.S. 57 (1939); Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S.
334 (1932); McColgan v. Maier Brewing Co., 134 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1943); In re
Humeston, 83 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1936); In re Garfield Fire Clay Co., 46 F. Supp. 932
(W.D. Pa. 1942). But cf. In re Berkshire Hardware Co., 39 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1941).
Thus, when business has been carried on by the trustee or debtor in possession,
the courts have maintained the distinction set out in the text by holding ,that certain
taxes, if incurred by the business in readily ascertainable amounts and reasonably ap•
portionable over the period before and after bankruptcy, may constitute claims in
part entitled to fourth priority and in part to first priority. This severability
concept has been applied mainly to withholding taxes on wage payments. In re
John Home Co., 220 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1955); Pomper v. United States, 196 F.2d
211 (2d Cir. 1952); In re Fago Constr. Corp., 162 F. Supp. 238 (W.D.N.Y. 1957).
Contra, In re Demos Cafe Inc., 5 CCH STAND, F:m. TAX REP. ,r 9223 (W.D. Mich.
1951). Where not severable, a payment of the entire tax by the trustee would necessarily be an expense of administration. E.g., Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., supra;
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Liberdar Holding Co., 74 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1934); In re Portage
Rubber Co., 288 Fed. 182 (6th Cir. 1923).
13. 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947).
14. By statute, the amount of the tax is ,to be deducted from wages by the employer "as and when paid." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3102(a).
15. United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26, 33 (8th Cir. 1947).
16. See Hiller, The Folly of the Fogarty Case, 32 REF. J. 54 (1958); Seligson,
Creditors' Rights, N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L 323, 336 (1957); Seligson, Bankruptcy,
N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 357, 371 (1955); 56 MICH. L. REv. 631 (1958); 23 REF. J.
14 (1948); 22 REF. J. 84 (1948); 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 133 (1949).
Co., Ill F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1940); 3 CoLI.IER,
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the appellate courts. 17 In the principal case, the Third Circuit
clearly embraced the Fogarty position that the_ trustee is to be considered an employer making wage payments and thus is bound to
collect and pay withholding taxes on wage claim dividends. 18 But
the court repudiated the more controversial holding of Fogarty by
dropping these tax claims from the first to the fourth priority. Expressly rejecting a definitional classification of all post-bankruptcy
tax accruals as first priority, the court held that, whether prebankruptcy or post-bankruptcy in nature, only those taxes clearly
related to the development, preservation, or distribution of the
bankrupt's assets are entitled to the first priority.19
However, in adopting this more meaningful view of administrative expenses, the court failed to explain satisfactorily how the
taxes could be assigned even a fourth priority. The court initially
indicated that taxes accruing after the filing of the petition can
be treated as provable claims entitled to the fourth priority.20 But
such treatment is contrary to well-established authority21 and would
do considerable violence to the well-considered distinction between
pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy taxes. The court subsequently
hedged by ruling that withholding taxes can attach for purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act before wages are paid and thus accrue prior
to bankruptcy as normal fourth priority tax claims.22 Despite the
distortion of tax collection procedure which necessarily follows
from this latter interpretation, the court refused to permit provisions of the Bankruptcy Act to be limited by conflicting provisions in other statutes, such as the Internal Revenue Code, which
have incidental relationships to bankruptcy administration.23
In light of this position, it seems curious that this statutory
independence was not maintained throughout by attempting to reject the Fogarty decision in its entirety. Under that portion of the
Fogarty rationale which the court in the principal case clearly
accepted, only by resorting to the Treasury Department definitionsof "employer" and "wages" as adjuncts to the Bankruptcy Act can
the trustee be required to collect this tax as a normal employer.24
17. See, e.g., Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1957).
Several cases followed Fogarty to the extent of requiring the deductions, but refrained
from classifying them as administrative ~penses. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,
178 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1949). See also In re John Horne Co., 220 F.2d 33 (7th Cir.
1955).
18. 336 F.2d at 99 n.9.
19. Id. at 108.
20. Id. at 104.
21. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
22. 336 F.2d at 105.
23. Ibid.
24. See United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947). Fogarty relied on
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 340l(a), which defines "wages" as "all remuneration ••
for services performed by an employee for his employer••• .'' Section 304l(d) defines
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It is true that in most respects a trustee does stand in the position
of the bankrupt.25 For example, a trustee continuing a bankrupt
enterprise is an employer required to withhold ordinary taxes from
wage payments.26 On the other hand, a trustee who, as in the
principal case, is concerned solely with the liquidation and distribution of the bankrupt's assets cannot so easily be considered an
"employer" of the bankrupt's former employees, with whom he
has never established an employer-employee relationship. A payment by the latter trustee is a mere dividend-that is, a distribution
of a fund among various claimants pursuant to court order.27 The
apposite provisions of the Internal Revenue Code make no reference
to a trustee in bankruptcy, and the extension of a tax by implication
to such a trustee has not been favored. 28 By a more effectual endorsement of the statutory independence of the Bankruptcy Act, a
statute ostensibly equal in dignity to the Internal Revenue Code,
the court in the principal case could have carried its logic to the
point of rejecting Fogarty and priority claims for taxes on prebankruptcy wage dividends altogether. The court did not go this
far, however, and it is questionable whether any worthwhile policy
would be served by so doing.
The Court's argument that this tax is not a first priority expense
related to the administration of the estate is persuasive and should
effectively undermine the corresponding portion of Fogarty. But it is
also clear that without a distortion of the Internal Revenue Code or
a potentially dangerous departure from established bankruptcy
policy, these withholding and social security taxes cannot be regarded
as provable debts until the wages are actually paid. Since section
64a(4) by necessary implication and established judicial interpretation limits provable claims to those arising prior to the filing of the
petition, the designation of this tax as a fourth priority claim is
nearly as distortive of section 64a as would be a designation of the
same tax as an administrative expense.29
"employer" as the person for whom the service is performed, except that if that person
does not have "control" of payment of such wages then the term employer means the
person having such control. This exception is "designed solely to meet unusual
situations." Treas. Reg. § 31.340l(d)-l(g) (1964). See Century lndem. Co. v. Riddell,
317 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1963).
25. See In re B-F Building Corp. 284 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1960); Jones v. Dugan, 124
Md. 346, 92 Atl. '775 (1914).
26. Such taxes would be expenses of administration when paid. See, e.g., McColgan
v. Maier 'Brewing Co., 134 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1943); In re Garfield Fire Clay Co., 46
F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Pa. 1942).
27. See 56 MICH. L. REv. 631, 632 (1958); 23 REF. J .12, 14 (1948); 22 REF. J. 84
(1948). Cf. Seligson, Creditors' Rights, N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. LAW 323, 33'7 (1957).
28. See Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334 (1932); Reinecke v. Gardner,'
277 U.S. 239 (1928). Cf. Shongut v. Golden, 270 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1959).
29. A few cases have assigned taxes accruing after bankruptcy to the fourth priority.
E.g., In re Berkshire Hardware Co., 39 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1941). Such treatment
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Perhaps the court's holding was influenced by the fact that there
were ample funds in the principal case to allow payments even to
general creditors. But the court's solution leaves unanswered questions that would arise in the numerous cases in which distributions
from the estate will not reach all classes of claimants. For example,
suppose that the estate is sufficient to satisfy only first and second
priorities and that the trustee is to pay a five hundred dollar wage
claim, from which fifty dollars would normally be withheld for
taxes. Should this fifty dollars be applied toward third priority
claims, with any remainder applied to payment pro rata of tax
claims of all kinds entitled to fourth priority? Or should it go
directly to satisfy only the fourth priority tax claims arising by
virtue of the wage payments? If the latter, a section 64a(4) claim
would pre-empt a section 64a(3) claim and other fourth priority
claims and be afforded what amounts to second priority treatment.
If the former, a course the opinion seems to suggest, the employee's
earnings will be used not to pay his taxes, but rather his employer's
other liabilities. Both the employee and the government would be
hurt by such a distribution. In either case the second priority wage
dividend would be diminished by claims of an inferior status under
the normal order of priorities. The more reasonable alternative
would seem to be to treat the withholding taxes as a part of wages,
entitled to priority under section 64a(2), and not as either a first or
fourth priority. But difficulties will probably continue to surround
this complex issue until explicit provisions are adopted in the
Bankruptcy Act distinguishing between, and treating specifically,
the various taxes accruing before and after bankruptcy.

has been described as "completely inaccurate." 3 CoLLur,
at 1532.

op. cit. supra note 7, § 62.14,

